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Some Economic Implications of Public Labeling
John M. Crespi and Stéphan Marette
This article discusses economic issues related to public labeling. The main contributions in both the empirical and 
theoretical literatures are presented in order to motivate responses to the questions, when should a regulator promote 
public labeling, and what are the limits to and the possible market distortions from public labeling? Although the is-
sues are complicated, there is already much economic guidance that can be given to inform the policy debate over 
food labeling.
seeks to address three questions. First, when should 
a regulator promote public labeling? Second, if a 
labeling program is deemed necessary, what will be 
the limits to such a policy? Third, once the decision 
to label a good has been made, who should pay for 
the labeling program and how should the program 
be financed? All of these questions are crucial for 
developing a complete cost-benefit analysis prior to 
the imposition of a labeling program. For each issue, 
we present some of the main (and latest) contribu-
tions in both the empirical and theoretical literatures 
in order to provide policy makers with resources to 
help inform their decisions. It is important to keep 
in mind when reviewing this literature that although 
a label is proposed as a tool for mitigating certain 
market failures that have resulted from imperfect 
information (Akerlof 1970), the labeling itself may 
generate other distortions that can countermand any 
positive effect coming from the added information. 
At this stage in the debate over labeling, we feel it is 
important for economists to bring their knowledge 
to the fore.
Appropriate Signals Depend on the Type of 
Differentiation
Before examining these questions, a classification of 
different food product characteristics will be useful. 
Arguably all characteristics can be organized under 
two categories reflecting consumers’ preferences: 
vertical and horizontal product differentiation. Un-
der vertical differentiation, if products of differing 
quality are offered at the same price, all consumers 
will buy that product with the highest perceived 
level of quality. Food safety and product nutri-
tion belong to this category, as no rational person 
would knowingly choose an unsafe product over a 
safe one if the price were the same (for a thorough 
review of the literature on food safety economics, 
see Antle 2001). The French “Label Rouge” is a 
classic example of a signal for poultry quality under 
1 See Caswell (1997), Teisl and Roe (1998), and Dimitri (1999) 
for very complete surveys and historical examinations.
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Today’s consumers are faced with a plethora of food 
labels concerning safety, nutrition, characteristics, 
geographic origin, and organic status, just to name a 
few. There are eco-labels to identify green products, 
labels proclaiming that a product is “cruelty free,” 
labels indicating whether milk comes from “BSE-
free” cows, and labels on goods processed from in-
puts using genetically modified organisms (GMO). 
As an inspection seal of a product’s characteristics, 
third-party certification insures (to some extent) the 
credibility of the information, namely that a labeled 
product conforms to some standardized principle. In 
this article we examine the economic issues related 
to public labeling, which is labeling or certification 
defined or organized by some regulatory authority 
such as that which arises through governmental 
grading, inspection, or regulatory oversight.1 As 
such, we examine the economic literature encom-
passing two main aspects of public labeling: when 
a public agency directly controls the entire labeling 
process and when private, third-party middlemen 
(or producer associations) certify those goods that 
meet the particular specifications defined by a 
regulator.
Arrow et al. (1996) show how economic argu-
ments may be used to inform one’s rationale when 
using a cost-benefit analysis. Taking their premise as 
our cue, we argue that there are important economic 
considerations to any discussion of public policy on 
food labeling, and although the issues are compli-
cated, there is already much economic guidance that 
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a vertical differentiation framework (Ménard 1996; 
Westgren 1999) where the label signals the higher-
quality product.
Under horizontal differentiation, if products 
with different characteristics are offered at the 
same price, consumers will choose among the 
goods according to their individual preferences for 
the various characteristics inherent in the goods. For 
example, wines have such a diversity of tastes that 
even if a Chardonnay and a Cabernet were offered 
at the same price there would still be a demand for 
both wines. In Europe, labels proclaiming Protected 
Designation of Origin (PDO) and Protected Geo-
graphical Indication (PGI) link products to their 
geographic origin, thereby promoting a specific 
taste or quality linked to a region (EEC 1992).
Some characteristics are not reflected in the 
physical characteristics of a commodity, but may 
reflect processes or conditions of production that, 
in and of themselves, impart value to the consumer. 
This is the case for the ethical characteristics em-
bodied in a “cruelty free” production processes 
(Blandford and Fulponi 1999), green characteristics 
(Kirchhoff 2000), or country-of-origin labels. 
In reality, most products contain a multitude of 
characteristics, which raises the issue of how spe-
cific a label must be in order to be effective. For 
example, precisely what constitutes an “organic 
food” has been very difficult to define (Browne 
et al. 2000). The United States Department of 
Agriculture’s (USDA) new guidelines on organic 
food certification came after years of discussion 
with industry groups about what characteristics 
could be considered organic. The new regulations 
prevent organic producers from using irradiation to 
decontaminate products, sewage sludge as fertilizer, 
and genetically modified ingredients (USDA 2003), 
although some had argued that these techniques did 
not affect “organic” production since the foods were 
not produced using conventional, chemical fertil-
izers, or pesticides. Because such characteristics are 
hard for consumers to detect, credible third-party 
certification is necessary to ensure the validity of 
the program.
For food safety and other risks, public interven-
tion is generally crucial in choosing among dif-
ferent proposals to reassure consumers or restore 
confidence (Henson and Caswell 1999). When 
human health is at stake, public intervention often 
favors command and control instruments such as 
Minimum Safety Standards (MSS) or the threat 
of litigation. MSS can be an efficient policy tool 
because it simply eliminates those products that do 
not comply with certain minimum requirements. 
In other cases, rather simple informational notices 
that allow consumers to make informed choices 
may be preferable. When risk is deemed to be 
small or non-lethal, giving consumers the choice 
among different levels of risk at different prices 
may be economically efficient (Beales, Craswell, 
and Salop 1981). Labeling thus insures product di-
versity and freedom of choice, as some consumers 
prefer buying a risky product at a lower price than a 
higher-priced but less-risky product. As Golan and 
Kuchler (1999, 1187) point out, “People may also 
be less willing to accept involuntary risk than risk 
that is voluntarily assumed.”
A regulator is useful in setting up a common 
signal with a clear specification for producers and 
consumers (Crampes and Hollander 1995). Carpen-
tier, Latouche, and Rainelli (2002), for example, 
show the drawbacks arising from unclear policies in 
the case of labeling pork attributes in France. Ethi-
cal and green characteristics necessitate not only 
some sort of certification but also a clear definition 
of the characteristic in order to persuade consumers 
(Teisl, Roe, and Levy 1999). A consumer-education 
program may bring about such clarity provided that 
the complementary label is seen as credible and 
accurate (Sexton 1981). Public control over such 
certification is important so as to avoid misleading 
“green” labels (Hussain 2000) or eco-label prolif-
eration by private institutions (Ibanez 1998; Lohr 
1998). For green products, consumers may display 
asymmetric preferences due to inadequate informa-
tion resulting from label proliferation. For GMOs 
and non-GMOs, product diversity may be socially 
optimal and facilitated by labeling, with two pos-
sible types of message, namely this product “does 
contain” or “does not contain” GMOs (Caswell 
2000; Runge and Jackson 1999; Crespi and Marette 
2003). In brief, the regulator must maintain a clear 
definition for common labels or appellations if the 
goal of the label is to increase welfare. 
In agricultural markets, labeling aims at miti-
gating potential inefficiencies resulting from im-
perfect information about product characteristics. 
If consumers are not fully informed about product 
characteristics, they may consume an undesired 
characteristic or pay a price that does not reflect, 
for example, the risk associated with the good in 
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experience characteristics if quality is revealed 
after purchasing (Nelson 1970) and credence 
characteristics if quality is not revealed even after 
purchasing (Darby and Karni 1973). In practice, 
many labels for characteristics fall into the “cre-
dence” category (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996). 
For example, product safety, production conditions, 
GMOs, or ethical characteristics are unobservable 
qualities. Safety as a credence characteristic is a 
somewhat particular case of the experience charac-
teristic as the lag between consumption and illness 
increases. Moreover, even with goods commonly 
considered to be experience goods, consumers may 
have difficulty recognizing or remembering product 
quality if the overall quality is defined by a great 
number of characteristics or if the product’s origin 
is uncertain.
Because of these issues, public intervention may 
be required in the absence of private mechanisms 
to signal product characteristics. As Kessler (1999, 
30), who headed the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration from 1990 until 1997, recalls:
The food industry alone cannot recoup its 
credibility. The public is simply not going 
to believe any assessment of risk that comes 
from a source with much to lose by expos-
ing dangers. No purveyor of a product can 
be objective about the risks posed by its own 
products.
In other words, there is no reason that the signaling 
of characteristics will emerge spontaneously from a 
market equilibrium. Nayga, Pohosyan, and Nichols 
(2002), for example, show that for food irradiation, 
U.S. consumers trust the safety claims of public 
agencies much more than they do those of private 
firms. Interestingly, when the question of food qual-
ity is considered, Loisel and Couvreur (2001) show 
that a majority of French consumers (52%) trust 
independent consumer-action groups more than 
they do the French public agency for consumer 
protection (36%), but trust advertising (5%) and 
other government agencies (4%) much less.
Consider first the problem with experience 
characteristics. In this case, a producer may signal 
high quality via a price or advertising to maintain 
its reputation because it is easy to detect fraudulent 
claims in the case of experience goods. Even so, if 
numerous sellers exist, such a signal may actually 
become impossible because an individual seller’s 
ability to implement a signaling strategy depends 
on its profitability (Bagwell and Riordan 1991; Mil-
grom and Roberts 1986), and the more competitive a 
market, the more difficult it is to signal a high level 
of quality via a price or brand advertising.2 A firm 
needs some economic rent to allow it to finance a 
quality signal. Agricultural commodity markets in 
particular are generally competitive (which is argu-
ably not the case for the highly concentrated food 
industry), with the opportunities for merger limited 
by ownership structures and geographic boundaries. 
The need for a signal may be even more important 
when consumers cannot be certain of a product’s 
origin, which is the case when agricultural products 
from a variety of processors are sold at the retail 
level with no brand designation. On the other hand, 
with credence characteristics the absence of con-
sumer detection leads to the complete absence of 
revelation. Credence characteristics also have the 
added complication that no signal is credible with-
out third-party intervention. In brief, with experi-
ence goods the regulator has to consider whether or 
not private mechanisms are able to provide relevant 
information, while with credence goods no firm can 
validly provide information, since there is incentive 
to proffer misleading information.
Public institutions that certify product quality 
are thus very useful in providing information to 
buyers via governmental grading systems. Given a 
perfectly competitive situation, the cost of setting 
up a certification process or managing highly skilled 
inspectors is generally prohibitive for an individual 
producer. Further, some processes of certification 
require basic research and development (R&D). 
Thus much of the existence of these institutions is 
explained by the cost and the complexity of labo-
ratory or auditor services for reliably establishing 
a product’s quality level. Indeed, a single public 
agency may benefit from economies of scale when 
fixed R&D costs, certification, or promotion are 
high (Auriol and Schilizzi 2000). Nevertheless, 
for some industries, technology and knowledge are 
available, and a private middleman may develop a 
credible system of certification (Holleran, Bredhahl, 
and Zaibet 1999). For example, the various organic-
2 A positive price distortion (compared to the price under 
perfect information) is possible with experience goods if the 
sellers have to exert effort at each period to maintain product 
quality (i.e., a moral-hazard model with an infinite horizon; 
see Shapiro, 1983). However, in any finite-horizon model with 
moral hazard, sellers will cheat in the last period, hence in the 
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food-certification agencies in the U.S. act as private 
middlemen (Klonsky and Tourte 1998). As certifi-
cation costs may explain why private certification 
activities are generally very concentrated, a key 
issue may be the fostering of competition among 
middlemen to limit their rent capturing. One of the 
tradeoffs a regulator must make here would be be-
tween any efficiency in a possibly decreasing cost 
industry of certifiers and market power. Middlemen 
may provide worthwhile information even if the 
market power of middlemen may actually outweigh 
any positive effect coming from information disclo-
sure (Spulber 1996). Wolinsky (1993) argues that 
with credence characteristics, competition among 
experts leads to revelation; private certification is 
therefore preferable when competition between 
middlemen is possible. However, even with pri-
vate certification the label specification may require 
regulatory intervention to lend credibility to the 
otherwise private signal.3
In brief, in the case of experience-good labeling, 
the private sector under competition is likely more 
efficient than a public regulator. However, market 
failure and the inability of the private sector to po-
lice itself should be of far greater concern to policy 
makers in the case of credence-good labeling.
The Limitations of Public Labeling in Signaling 
Quality
A regulator must keep in mind that for an unin-
formed public, a signal such as a label may provide 
little relevant information. It is therefore crucial to 
determine whether consumers find the proposed 
label useful. In this venue, economists have added 
to the general understanding of consumers’ willing-
ness to pay for labeled attributes through the use 
of experimental studies. For the sake of space we 
provide just a sampling of these. 
Estimations of premia and market valuation of 
environmental attributes can be found in Blend 
and van Ravenswaay (1999) and in Nimon and 
Beghin (1999a). For food safety, willingness to pay 
measures have been determined using contingent 
valuation, surveys, and experimental auctions (for 
instance, see Hayes et al. 1995 for the reduction of 
pathogen contamination; Hoban 1997 for biotech-
nology acceptance;  Lusk et al. 2001, Lusk and Fox 
2002, and Lusk, Roosen and Fox 2003 for meat; 
and Shogren et al. 1999 and Nayga, Poghosyan, 
and Nichols 2002 for irradiated foods). Obviously, 
the main limits of such empirical methods are 
sample size and aggregation to the general popula-
tion. Nevertheless, Shogren et al. (1999) show that 
revealed willingness to pay for food safety in retail 
and laboratory settings may be very close, providing 
evidence that consumer preferences for safety, and 
hence for safety labeling, may be discerned from 
laboratory settings. On the other hand, although 
there is a growing movement for the labeling of 
credence characteristics that reflect aspects of pro-
duction conditions such as ethical characteristics, 
animal welfare, or the absence of child labor, studies 
have generally shown that a very low premia exist 
for these labels. For instance, Bigot (2002) shows 
that while 53% of French consumers revealed that 
they would pay a premium for such characteris-
tics, when it comes to the actual amount paid, that 
premium would be no more than 5%; another 44% 
would pay no such a premium.
Consumers’ ability to understand the label is a 
crucial point that may get lost in any discussion of 
costs and benefits. For example, the U.S. Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act of 1994 has generally 
been seen as a successful food-labeling program. 
Finke (2000) determined the key reason for its 
success was the program’s emphasis on educat-
ing consumers about what the label meant. Other 
researchers have shown that signaling will not be 
socially advantageous when product differentiation 
is slight or when consumers’ premia for labeled 
characteristics are very low. Mojduszka and Cas-
well (2000), for example, showed that mandatory 
nutrition labeling is in part successful because of 
its significant addition to the amount of desired 
dietary information available to consumers. On 
the other hand, the USDA’s grades of beef quality 
based upon fat content may not reflect the taste of 
many consumers who have a preference for low-fat 
meat (Cox, McMullen, and Garrod 1990; Unnevehr 
and Bard 1993). The difficulty in knowing when to 
promote a label is reinforced when consumer de-
mand is affected by imagined risks. Although Pollak 
(1998) is more pessimistic about whether and how 
imagined risks should be accounted for in cost-
benefit analyses, Viscusi, Vernon, and Harrington 
(1996, 663) remind us that in the face of a possible 
3 Perfect monitoring is costly (see De and Nabar 1991 
and Mason and Sterbentz 1994 for imperfect product 
testing). Chalfant and Sexton (2002) show that grading 
errors can increase industry profit. See Coestier (1998) 
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crisis “an important function of the government is to 
acquire more scientific information than is feasible 
for an individual to obtain [and] to communicate 
this information effectively to the public [since] 
highly publicized events often are associated with 
substantial risk perceptions even though the risks 
involved may not be great.”
Some public-labeling intervention may actually 
reinforce brand-label proliferation. Wine in Europe 
is a good example of such appellation prolifera-
tion. Peri and Gaeta (1999) count more than 400 
official appellations in the wine sector in Italy 
alone, a profusion that insures product diversity 
but certainly increases buyer confusion (see also 
Consumer Reports 1997). Similarly, Berthomeau 
(2002) discusses the difficulty that the various 
French appellations have had in entering new ex-
port markets because of the absence of any clear 
specification that would distinguish one appellation 
from another in the consumers’ minds. Indeed, Lo-
isel and Couvreur (2001) show that even in France 
such diverse quality labels obfuscate the signals. 
For example, the recognition of quality labels by 
French consumers is only 43% for “Label Rouge,” 
18% for “l’Agriculture Biologique,” and 12% for 
“Appellations d’Origine Contrôlée.” Although “La-
bel Rouge” is a well-established label, the fact that 
less than half of French consumers recognize it is 
suggestive of the problems inherent in any label.
Eco-labeling seems to be especially prone to 
consumer-identification issues, which may cause 
additional problems for regulators of these prod-
ucts because of their intended welfare effects. In 
the case of eco-labels, there are usually perceived 
externalities that a regulator is either trying to miti-
gate or enhance. For example, an eco-label may 
use consumers’ preferences to stimulate demand 
in order to encourage certain production processes 
and discourage others. In such cases, any augmenta-
tion of total welfare is still linked to the provision 
of information but the benefits presumably extend 
beyond the consumer to society in general (for 
specific examples see Gudmundsson and Wessells 
2000; Grolleau 2001; and Mattoo and Singh 1994 
for a simple policy test and Larson 2003 for an ap-
plication to shade-grown coffee). In order to bring 
about this increase in welfare, however, consumer 
information must be especially clear, as ambiguity 
can create unintended problems. Smith and Potter 
(1996), examining the EU eco-label program, ex-
plain how a well-intentioned policy became mired 
in bureaucratic and informational difficulties result-
ing in rather inefficient environmental regulations. 
Swallow and Sedjo (2000) show that even when 
policies are clear and arguably straightforward to 
implement, their consequences need not always 
be so. In some cases, eco-labels may even pervert 
such policy goals of biodiversity or sustainability 
if certification leads to reallocation of land toward 
less ecologically sustainable uses. 
Country-of-origin labeling is an increasingly 
touchy subject among policy makers. Although 
there are but a handful of studies, economists have 
shown that the origin of food products does seem to 
matter—at least for European consumers (Hassan 
and Monier-Dilha 2001). Loureiro and McCluskey 
(2000) used hedonic approaches to show that label 
of origin for fresh meat in Spain results in price 
premia. Roosen, Lusk, and Fox (2003) also sug-
gest that consumers place more importance on 
labels of origin as opposed to private brands for 
beef, although this study is applied to European 
consumers facing mad cow disease, for which re-
gional labels take on a highly significant meaning. 
In contrast, Bonnet and Simioni (2001) show that 
French consumers do not value the quality signal 
provided by the Protected Designation of Origin for 
Camembert cheese. In this case, the brand appears 
to be the relevant signal. 
Effects of Labeling on the Marketing Chain and 
Producer Organizations
Labeling necessitates traceability and, likewise, the 
resultant traceability technologies and investments 
that could influence contract design or vertical in-
tegration in the agri-food chain. Two important 
issues for contract design are the sharing of the 
traceability cost among agents in the supply chain 
and the type of liability in the case of cheating. For 
issues linked to the marketing chain—traceability 
or identity preservation—readers are referred to the 
works by Barjolles, Chappuis, and Riordan (1999), 
Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker (1998), Hennessy 
(1996), Vetter and Karantinis (2002), and Bullock 
and Desquilbet (2002). As traceability is essential 
for labeling, the information should be controlled 
by a third party or by the government. A regula-
tor should define a complementary control policy 
through random inspections and fines on discovered 
cheaters, since enforcement of the control policy is 
crucial for the label’s credibility.88   November 2003 Journal of Food Distribution Research 34(3) Crespi and Marette Some Economic Implications of Public Labeling   89
 To prevent free riding and to preserve a com-
mon reputation, European and U.S. legislation allow 
farmers to jointly determine and jointly signal the 
quality of their products through promotions and la-
beling, albeit under very specific rules (Tirole 1996; 
Bourgeon and Coestier 1996; Crespi and Sexton 
2003).4 Some voluntary labels, such as European 
indications of origin or quality (e.g., PDO and PGI, 
discussed above), may even bring about market 
power because joint signaling necessitates some 
cartelization of marketing in the industry. However, 
the negative effect of the producers’ market power 
may be outweighed by the positive effect of quality 
improvement and signaling (Marette, Crespi, and 
Schiavina 1999). Producer organizations must be 
scrutinized to make sure they are not misusing their 
authority by excluding certain competitors. Label-
ing in agriculture has led to antitrust investigations 
for well-known products. Cases include cheeses 
in Italy and France, poultry in France, and ham in 
Italy.5 Generally, the contested practices included 
price fixing, output reduction, and limits to entry 
(specifically, see Table 2 in Lucatelli 2000). These 
practices were recognized as infringements of na-
tional-competition laws because they imposed re-
strictions that were not necessary for the production 
and promotion of high-quality products. Although 
the antitrust authority did recognize coordination 
as sometimes useful to improve quality, the mes-
sage the Italian and French regulators sent was that 
governments should be vigilant in preventing an 
abuse of the spirit of the labeling regulations.
Optimal Public Policy: When Should a Regulator 
Promote Public Labeling? 
Clearly, a mandatory labeling system will be more 
costly than a voluntary system because the regulator 
needs to monitor all producers, which will increase 
bureaucracy.6 In certain cases, mandatory and vol-
untary public labeling can actually hurt competition, 
since mandatory labeling may limit sellers’ entry by 
adding costs to doing business (Caswell 1998). On 
the other hand voluntary labeling need not be benign 
if sellers are able to design labels that create barriers 
to entry in a particular segment of the market.
Even with these caveats, however, given the 
importance of labeling, the questions remain what 
is the best way to finance a public inspection pro-
gram, and who should pay for it? Surprisingly little 
has been written on these topics in the economics 
literature. A recent study by the United States De-
partment of Agriculture found a variety of user-fi-
nancing schemes being used by food-safety inspec-
tion agencies around the world (MacDonald et al. 
1999). Some public inspection agencies charge an 
inspected firm a fixed fee regardless the number of 
units inspected, others charge a per-unit fee, while 
still other agencies charge no fee, the inspection 
costs being borne by the public through taxes. For 
example, the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection 
Service funded only 13.5 percent of its 1996 costs 
through the collection of $85 million in user fees 
(MacDonald et al. 1999, iii), with the remainder 
funded by taxpayers.
The method of financing is important, since 
different methods of raising revenues for labeling 
impose different distortionary costs on the econo-
my. If the public is expected to pay for a labeling 
program that is managed by an official agency, a 
lump-sum tax may be used. In this case it is well 
known that lump-sum taxes are generally preferred 
over other types of financing like sales taxes or user 
fees because, although they reduce overall income, 
lump-sum taxes do not distort market behavior. In 
the case of food labeling, however, there can be very 
good reasons why a general lump-sum tax may not 
be optimal, even though it is non-distorting. 
First, citizens may already feel that income 
taxes are too high or there may already be a high 
opportunity cost of public funds making a label-
ing program subordinate to other uses of general 
revenue. Second, and more importantly, food-con-
sumption decisions are highly personal so that a 
governmental program to label some characteristic 
may be important for the individual who consumes 
4 Article 81(3) of the European Union allows agreements 
among sellers “which contribute to improving the production 
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit.” Antitrust authorities in Europe are vigilant regarding 
producer coordination and have made the necessity of producer 
cooperation to achieve “technical or economic progress”a key 
point for antitrust exemption.
5 See the Conseil de la Concurrence (Paris), decisions 92-D-
30 (April 1992) and 94-D-41 (July 1994) and Autorita Garante 
della Concorenzza e del Mercato (Rome) decisions 3999 (July 
1996), 4352 (October 1996), 6549 (November 1998).
6 Hooker and Caswell (1996), Segerson (1999), and Crespi 
and Marette (2001a) compare mandatory and voluntary 
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the good but may mean nothing to a consumer who 
does not purchase the labeled good (e.g. vegetarians 
care very little about the USDA’s inspection seals 
on meat products). 
The regulator may therefore prefer direct user-
financing of the public labeling program where the 
cost of the program is financed through fees on the 
producers and/or consumers who benefit directly 
from the information. Because it shows that produc-
ers and/or consumers are willing to “accept” the fees 
that cover the costs of certification, a balanced bud-
get for an agency that has implemented user fees is 
a signal of the relevance of the activity (i.e. that the 
public benefits of the labeling program are greater 
than or equal to its costs). When such a decision is 
made, there still remains the question of the type 
of user fee that should be implemented.
To our knowledge, in the economic literature on 
food labeling there is only one article that directly 
addresses the appropriate type of fee. Crespi and 
Marette (2001a) show in an application to food-
safety certification that in most cases either a per-
unit or an ad valorem fee will be preferable over 
a fixed fee on the processing firm. Their rationale 
is straightforward. Prior to a labeling program, an 
informational externality exists in the food prod-
uct since consumers are uncertain of the safety of 
unlabeled food. The informational externality is 
mitigated or eliminated through the use of a fee 
that pays for the labeling program, leading to low-
ered consumption of unlabeled goods and increased 
consumption of labeled goods. Furthermore, either 
a per-unit or an ad valorem fee is preferable because 
such fees maintain competition among those sellers 
who sell the same type of products. The sellers and 
the consumers of the labeled products will incur the 
cost because the fee is passed on in the price, with 
the share of burden determined through the relative 
supply and demand elasticities, so while there is a 
welfare loss due to the fee, there is no further market 
distortion. On the other hand—and just as important 
for a regulator to understand—is that in the presence 
of such informational externalities a fixed fee can 
actually lead to a greater market distortion through 
a monopolization effect that arises in this case, as 
only a firm with some market power will be able to 
take on the fixed certification burden. The choice 
of a fixed fee would only be justified if the number 
of sellers is very low and the cost to the inspection 
agency itself is fixed. For example, the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration may well be justified in 
their use of fixed fees for pharmaceutical inspec-
tions since the FDA’s costs stem largely from fixed 
inspection technologies and there are few firms in-
volved due to patent restrictions. Since food produc-
tion and processing are arguably more competitive 
than drug production, and since the largest share of 
the costs is realized in inspector hours (i.e., “vari-
able” rather than “fixed” costs), food inspection 
and labeling such as that performed by the USDA 
is likely to be welfare improving if per-unit or ad 
valorem fees cover the inspection costs.
In summary, in the case of food-safety or other 
vertical-differentiation labeling, either the firms 
who produce the good or the consumers themselves 
should bear the burden of the program unless the op-
portunity cost of public funds is low or the labeling 
program affects a very large share of the citizenry. 
Where the burden is placed upon the firm and the 
consumer, the optimal type of assessment is typi-
cally a per-unit or ad valorem fee rather than a fixed 
fee; again, it matters little where the fee is imposed 
since the actual incidence of the tax depends on the 
relative demand and supply elasticities.
One of the major concerns today among export-
ers is how the requirement of a label by an importing 
country will affect the demand for a good. Recent 
work on this issue has been performed by Smith 
and Potter (1996), Mahé (1997), Bureau, Marette, 
and Schiavina (1998), Hooker (1999), Nelson et 
al. (1999), Nimon and Beghin (1999b), Crespi and 
Marette (2001b), and Sheldon (2002). Labels entail 
international trade implications, such as non-tariff 
barriers. Economists and policy makers have argued 
that, ideally, regulators should develop trade policy 
to maximize integration of any trade distortions 
coming from a labeling program (OECD 1999). 
The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) provided a framework 
for solving disputes through the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body; it tackles the problem of non-tariff 
trade barriers through the Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary (SPS) agreement and a strengthened Technical 
Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement. The scope of 
the 1979 TBT agreement was also extended dur-
ing the Uruguay Round, where compliance with 
relevant international standards was encouraged. 
The TBT agreement is wide-ranging and covers all 
technical regulations and standards (except those 
falling under the SPS agreement), including those 
relating to packaging and labeling. 
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nounced in January of 2003 that he wished to 
bring a WTO case against the EU’s GMO-labeling 
requirement, calling it a “Luddite” policy (Alden 
2003). The U.S. position is that without a scientific 
basis for segregation, such labeling amounts to a 
non-tariff trade barrier because it imposes a labeling 
“tariff” on mostly U.S. producers who use GMOs. 
The policy difference between the two sides is that, 
for the most part, the U.S. is arguing about labeling 
based on the conventions of the SPS agreement—
since GM foods pose no more food-safety risk than 
do conventional foods, there is no rationale to the 
labeling. The Europeans counter that under the TBT 
agreement, countries may take precautionary mea-
sures against risk (Caswell 2000; Sheldon 2002). 
These are legal issues to be considered by policy 
makers; what is largely missing from the debate is 
a discussion of exactly how consumer preferences 
should enter the argument.
Giannakas and Fulton (2003) and Crespi and 
Marette (2003) do not consider the causes of 
welfare changes from the presence of GMOs but 
simply assert that consumers are maximizing wel-
fare based upon their perceptions. In their model, 
consumers maximize utility based upon their prefer-
ences toward GM products regardless the basis for 
these preferences. If consumers have lower utility 
from the consumption of GMOs, it does not matter 
whether that utility is lower because they are be-
ing “duped” or because they have preferences that 
are based upon valuations other than the safety of 
the food. Using this simple framework, Crespi and 
Marette determine a practical test to help policy 
makers discern whether mandatory labeling is being 
used to increase societal welfare or whether it is be-
ing used as a trade barrier. Essentially, in a country 
that requires labeling, if the ratio of consumers 
concerned about GMOs to indifferent consumers 
is low, a voluntary label on GM goods is likely all 
that is necessary to improve welfare; if this ratio is 
high, a mandatory label on GM goods may very well 
increase welfare in that country. The implication 
is that mandatory labels on GM goods in nations 
where most consumers show little interest in the 
debate should be closely examined. 
Conclusion
In summarizing the work of economists on food-
labeling issues, we have argued that when a public 
label has been mandated, it is imperative that the 
regulatory agency take into account several impor-
tant factors before deciding the type of label to use. 
First, the regulator needs to take into account the na-
ture of the product, since the success of a particular 
labeling program will very likely depend on whether 
a product is vertically or horizontally differentiated, 
whether the good is a credence or an experience 
good, and whether the label is clear or creates infor-
mational externalities. Second, the regulator must 
keep in mind how the labeling cost will affect the 
structure of the market and who should pay for the 
label. As discussed, in most cases a per-unit or ad 
valorem fee is both efficient and sufficient to bring 
about a welfare improvement if a label is deemed 
necessary. By showing the relevant research to in-
form the policy debate, we hope that this paper will 
serve as a reference for policy makers.
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